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1. Introduction
Tax instrumentswith theaimofimprovingtheenvironmentareusedwidelyinmanycountries. Inthe
US, excisetaxesarelevied on productsthatadverselyaffecttheenvironment, e.g.,chlorofluorocarbons,while
others have been and are used as a source of revenue to deal with (potential)environmentalhazards. Inseveral
European countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norwayand Sweden) carbon taxes currentlyapplywhile the
European Commission hasconsidered theuseofcarbon taxesthroughoutallmembersoftheEuropeanUnion
(EU). The US government has also considered the introduction of carbon taxes. The use of excise taxes for
environmentalpurposes, however, islikelytoimpacton tradeflowsand thecompetitivenessoffirmstowhich
theenvironmentaltax applies. Clearly, manufacturersin an importingcountryfaced withtheimpositionofan
environmental excise tax may argue that the resulting cost increase reduces their competitiveness vis-à-vis
imported goods. In such circumstances, there will be a demand for restrictions on imports to offset this
competitive disadvantage, i.e., there should be a corresponding border tax adjustment to offset the impact of
the environmental tax. In principle, such bordertax adjustmentsdonotcontraveneGATT/WTO guidelines:
Articles III and XVI of GATT allow contracting parties to adjust excise taxes on imported products up to the
same level as those applied on domestic products, i.e., taxes on imported goods imposed on the same basis as
domestic excise taxes are not regarded as being discriminatory.
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Bagwell and Staiger (2001a; 2001b) have addressed this issue more formally in terms of the debate
over whether the WTO/GATT is unfriendlyto environmental concerns.
2 There is a commonlyheld fear that,
due to pressures of maintaining international competitiveness, countries will compromise on enforcing strict
environmental standards, i.e., governments will either resist setting tougher regulations, what Bagwell and
Staiger (2001a) term “regulatorychill”, ortheymayeven setlessrestrictiveregulations, theso-called “raceto
the bottom”. Based on a specific theoretical model of GATT (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999), they argue that
thesetypesofproblemscan beresolved through theexistingWTO/GATT rules. In thecontextoftheirmodel,
theconflictbetween negotiated tariffreductionsand incentivestointroduceenvironmentalregulationscanbe2
seen as one of how to secure “property rights over negotiated market access commitments” (Bagwell and
Staiger, 2001a:19). Negotiated marketaccesscan bereducedintwoways:first,acountrymayfeelconstrained
from unilaterally raising its tariffs because of WTO/GATT obligations, and, instead chooses unilaterally to
lower domestic standards, thus improving the competitive position of domestic firms; second, a countrymay
raiseitsdomesticstandards, and then raisetariffsbymorethanthatnecessarytooffsetthecompetitiveeffectof
the higher standards. In order to resolve this problem, Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) argue that, though a
countrycan set anydomestic standards it wishes, in order to dealwithincreasedimportcompetition,itneedsto
address market access through its tariff policy in a manner that maintains negotiated levels of market access.
Thisamountstoallowinggovernmentsboth increased sovereigntyovertheirdomesticregulatorychoicesand
also a way of meeting their international trading obligations. As noted above, the WTO/GATT rules already
allow for such a response under GATT Article III. Countries are permitted to set border tax adjustments to
offsettheimpactofincreased marketaccessarisingfromhigherdomesticenvironmentaltaxes.
3 Specifically,
countries imposing border tax adjustments in excess of the domestic tax would be regarded as acting in a
discriminatory manner and hence in contravention of Article III.
While the rationale for border tax adjustments for environmental excise taxes is clear cut, the case
wheretheenvironmentalexcisetax isapplied toan intermediategood butitisthefinalgoodthatisimportedis
alessstraight-forward case. Neverthelessthecompetitivenessissuestillarises:domesticproducersofthefinal
good facean increasein thecostofintermediateinputsduetotheenvironmentalexcisetaxwhichplacesthem
at a disadvantage vis-à-vis final imported goods where the cost of intermediates is lower in the absence of the
environmental tax. In such cases, the border tax adjustment relates to the final derivative imported good.
Since environmental excise taxes are typically targeted at intermediate-producing sectors, the appropriate
treatment of imported final goods is clearlya relevant issue. This issue is also addressed in the GATT/WTO
framework: as Davie (1995) reports, GATT/WTO rules extend to border tax adjustments of imported
derivative products when the environmental excise tax is imposed on intermediates. A GATT Panel has3
confirmed the application of border taxes on the derivative product when the domestic tax is imposed on
upstream producers.
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This paper focuses on the use of environmental excise taxes imposed on domestic intermediategoods
and the appropriate tax treatment of imported final products that use the intermediate input but yet remain
untaxed in the exporter’s country. We should note that in the context of GATT/WTO rules, border
adjustmentsarenot motivated byenvironmentalconcernsbut,asDemaretandStewardson(1994,p.14)note,
“to preserve competitive equality in international trade.” However, given the potential for mercantilist
protectionism, and the need tomaintain negotiated market access commitments,identifyingthelikelyeffectof
border tax adjustments on trade flows is of obvious importance. If both theintermediateandfinalsectorswere
perfectlycompetitive, theappropriatetreatmentforimportswould berelativelystraightforward:animporttax
on the final good equal to the level of the environmental excise tax times the extent to which the intermediate
good enters the domestic downstream firm’s cost function, would raise marginal costs for the importer bythe
same amount, and consequently will have a neutral effect on imports (Poterba and Rotemberg, 1995). This
treatment of imported derivative products broadlymatches border tax adjustments as currentlyapplied in the
United States. Ifintermediateand finalgoodsmarketsareoligopolistic, however, taxingimportedfinalgoods
at the samelevelastheenvironmentalexcisetax on domesticintermediateswillhaveanon-neutralimpacton
imports. Aswillbeshown, theroleoffirmbehavior, i.e., whetherfirmsfollowCournotorBertrandstrategies,
will determine the extent of non-neutrality.
Introducing imperfect competition into the analysis highlights a potential source of conflict between
those concerned with non-discriminatory trade barriers and those concerned with the environment.
International economists often use the notion of ‘neutrality’ or ‘equivalence’ in assessing alternative trade
policy instruments, i.e., that the level or form of trade policy instruments result in the same limitation on
imports. When marketsareimperfectlycompetitive, theissueof‘neutrality’ismoredifficulttoassessastrade
and environmentalpolicyinstrumentshavepotentiallydifferenteffectscomparedwithaperfectlycompetitive4
market setting. As will be shown in this paper, deviating from the assumption of perfect competition will
likely result in lower border tax adjustments for the domestic environmental excise tax if the principle of
‘neutrality’ in trade is to be upheld; as will be shown, in some cases, maintaining the principle of ‘neutrality’
may justify an import subsidy as the appropriate border adjustment. This issue of the appropriate border tax
adjustments for domestic environmental excise taxes arises due to the purpose of these border taxes under
GATT/WTO statutes, i.e., that border taxes can be used but should not be discriminatory, and assumptions
about market structure in up- and downstream sectors.
Adhering to the principle of ‘neutrality’, therefore, has the potential to create tension between
environmentalists and trade experts for two reasons. First, environmentalists would argue that such taxes are
required to influence production and/or consumptiondecisionsinordertoimproveenvironmentalquality. The
GATT/WTO agenda is not focused on environmental concerns per se but rather trade and, specifically, how
environmental policies may affect trade flows. As Demaret and Stewardson (op. cit., p.7) state, since the
border tax adjustments are, “simply to equalize competitive conditions in international trade [t]hese rules do
not always fit comfortably with the situation where domestic taxes are used to achieve a particular policy
goal......such as environmental protection.” Second, even ifenvironmentalistsaccepted in principletheneed
for border tax adjustments, as we show in this paper, when markets are imperfectly competitive, domestic
environmental excise taxes could be matched by lower border tax adjustments or even import subsidies on
foreign goods if the GATT/WTO statutes are to be upheld.
AsfarasGATT/WTO rulesareconcerned, therearetwocaveatsrelevantfordiscussioninthispaper.
First, GATT/WTO does not definewhatbordertax adjustmentsaremeantto“equalize”with respecttotrade,
i.e., whether it is the level of imports or theshareof imports. UsingBagwell and Staiger’s(2001a) language,
the rules are not clear about exactlywhat is meant bymaintaining market access. As is well-known from the
internationaleconomicsliterature, howneutralityisdefined islikelytomatter. Second, environmentalpolicy
can beeitherin theformofexcisetaxeson certain goodsorinputsorintheformoftaxesoncertainproduction5
processes which may contribute to environmental pollution. Examples of environmental excise taxes would
include a fuel tax, a tax on leaded gasoline, a tax on ozone-depleting chemicals, and so on. Examples of
environmental process taxes include taxes on emissions, wastedisposalandwatereffluent. Clearlybothforms
of taxes have the same intent, i.e., to influence production/consumption decisions so that environmental
damage is reduced. However, even though both forms of tax may affect trade flows, GATT/WTO statutes
permit only border tax adjustments for excise taxes not process taxes. As Demaret and Stewardson (op. cit.)
note, this dates back to the original formulation of GATT rules when it was generally believed that indirect
taxes were shifted forward while direct taxes were not: thus, border tax adjustments would apply only when
environmental excise taxes were used but would not be permitted for any other form of environmental
legislation.
5 As noted in a recent WTO newsletter (WTO, 1997), this has led to several WTO member
countries arguing that existing GATT/WTO statutes on border tax adjustments are no longer valid due to the
increased importanceofenvironmentalconcernsamongWTO signatories. Again, thisisan issuewhich may
bemuse those explicitly concerned with environmental policy. Whatever the inadequacies of current
GATT/WTO statutes, however, for the purposes of this paper the focus will be on the appropriate border tax
adjustments for domestic environmental excise taxes, and how they affect trade.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the use of domestic environmental excise taxes and
thenatureofbordertax adjustmentsapplied in theUS arereviewed. Thetheoreticalframeworkwhichallows
for oligopolyat both final and intermediate stages, i.e.,successiveoligopoly,isintroducedinsection3. Taking
astheappropriatebenchmark(s)theexpectationthatbordertaxadjustmentsshouldhaveeitheraneutraleffect
on the volume of imports of final goods, or a neutral effect on the market share of imports, the way in which
marketstructuredeterminestheexistenceand extentofnon-neutralityisexplored in section4.
6 Wealsoshow
thatbordertax adjustmentscan impacton firm'sprofitseven when thebordertax issetsuchastokeepimports
at the original level. Domestic firms will lose out even if the when a combination of environmental taxes and
bordertax adjustmentsareused even ifthelevelofnegotiated marketaccessremainsunchanged. Asummary6
of the paper and conclusions are presented in section 5.
2. Environmental Excise Taxes and Border Tax Adjustments in the United Statesand European
Union
The GATT/WTO framework is specific about the type of taxes that can be subject to border tax
adjustments. In arecentreportbytheWTO Committeeon TradeandtheEnvironment,thedistinctionbetween
directand indirecttaxeswasmadewith directtaxesimposed directlyon producersnotbeingsubjecttoborder
tax adjustmentswhileindirecttaxes, i.e., taxesimposed directlyorindirectlyontheproduct,are(WTO,1997).
Although the relevance of this distinction has been questioned, and arguablydiscriminates against countries
that rely more on direct taxation, the distinction remains as the basic principle of the GATT/WTO rules on
border tax adjustments.
7 In addition, a distinction is made between the origin and destination principle with
the destination principle being the principle underlying GATT rules on border tax adjustments.
A range of excise taxes have been and are currently applied in the United States targeted to various
environmentalobjectives. Forexample, theso-called LUST tax isimposedonmotorfuels,appliedatarateof
$.001 pergallon ofgasoline, topayforenvironmentaldamageassociated withleakingundergroundtanks.
8 A
Superfund tax on petroleum, at a rate of $.147 per barrel, was used to fund the Oil Spill LiabilityTrust and a
fund for dealing with toxic waste sites. Dealing with toxic waste was also the primary purpose of the tax on
toxic chemicals, ranging from a rate of $.22 to $4.87 per tonne, while the tax on ozone-depleting chemicals,
principally chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), applied at a base rate of $3.35 which is increased by a dollar each
year, is aimed at restricting the use of CFCs as a manufacturing input (see Barthold, 1994, for a discussion).
Davie(op.cit.) reports that, taken together, these environmental excise taxes were expected to raise $2 billion
per year in the mid-1990s. With the exception of the LUST tax, which is imposed on motor fuels in general,
these environmental taxes include/have includedprovisionsforbordertaxesonimported(derivative)products.
In thecaseoftheSuperfund tax, forexample, importsofpetroleumproductsweretaxed atthesameperbarrel
rate as crude oil received by US refineries.
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In the case of the legislation dealing with the tax on CFCs, imported products containing CFCs are
taxed on the basis of the weight of CFCscontained in theproduct with theextent of CFC used determined by
the predominant method of US production. The regulations governing the use of the Superfund tax on toxic
chemicals also detailed the treatment of derivative products: imported substances were taxed at the rate that
would have been imposed by the chemical tax had the substance been produced in the United States.
Excise taxes are also widely used by many European countries. The list of taxes is similar to that for
theUnited Stateswith environmentalexcisetaxeson fuelapplied in almostallEU countries.Carbontaxesare
also used in Austria, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. Majocchi (2001) also noted recent European
Commission initiatives for taxing energy products while Italy has also considered the Italian government's
proposals for carbon/energytaxes either as part of European-wide initiatives or as unilateral policies. Several
European countries also have taxes applied to deal toxic waste and the disposal of environmental damaging
goods including CFC charges applied in Denmark.
In principle, border tax adjustments for domestic environmental excise taxes should have a neutral
effect on imports of the final product.
10 If the intermediate and final good producing sectors are imperfectly
competitive however, this may not necessarily be the case. For example, casual inspection of the set of
industries covered by the CFC border tax indicates that several of these industries, e.g., automobiles, heavy





The model introduced here is one of successive oligopoly, i.e., both the upstream (intermediate) and
downstream (final) stagesareimperfectlycompetitive. Atthedownstreamstage, thedomesticfirmcompetes8
with a foreign exporter of the final product. In the domestic upstream stage, two firms produce the
intermediate input which is assumed to be homogenous. Although the foreign upstream stage can have the
same structure, this sector is ignored in the present case. The domestic intermediate sector uses the
environmentally-harmfulinput;consequently,theenvironmentalexcisetaxraisestheintermediatefirms’costs,
which subsequently raises the downstream firm’s costs due to the price of the intermediate good. The
technologylinkingeach stageisoneoffixed proportions. Formally, x1=φ x
U,w he r ex1and x
Urepresentoutput
in the domestic downstream and upstream stages respectively, and where φ is the constant coefficient of
production.
11 To ease the exposition, φ is set equal to one in the framework outlined below. Arm’s length
pricing between the downstream and upstream stages is also assumed, i.e., the downstream stage takes input
prices as given.
In terms of the game-theoretic structure of the model, the timing of the firm’s strategy choice goes
from upstream to downstream. Specifically, given costs and the derived demand curve facing the upstream
sector, an upstream firm willmaximizeprofitscontingenton aconjectureofhowtheotherupstreamfirmwill
respond. This generates Nash equilibrium at the upstream stage. The intermediate input prices are taken as
given bythedomesticdownstreamfirmwhich maximizesprofitscontingenton theirexpectation ofhowtheir
foreign competitor will respond, thus giving Nash equilibrium at the downstream stage. Although it is
common toassumeaparticularfirmstrategy, thegeneralmodelintroduced belowallowsustoidentifytherole
of Cournot and Bertrand strategies in determining the outcome. In terms ofsolvingthemodel, equilibriumat
the downstream stage is derived first and then the upstream stage.
Equilibrium in the Downstream Market
The model is written in general form following Dixit (1986). Let x1 equal output of the domestic
downstream firm and x2 the output of its foreign competitor. The revenue functions can be written as:9
) , ( 2 1 1 x x R (1)
) , ( 2 1 2 x x R .( 2 )
We assume downward sloping demands and substitute goods.
Given (1) and (2), the relevant profit functions are given as:
x c - x , x R = 1 1 2 1 1 1 ) ( π (3)
, x c - x , x R = 2 2 2 1 2 2 ) ( π (4)
where c1 and c2 are the domestic and foreign firms’ respectivecosts. Firms’ costsrelatetothepurchaseofthe
intermediate input.
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are given as:
c = R v + R 1 2 , 1 1 1 , 1 (5)
c = R v + R 2 1 , 2 2 2 , 2 ,( 6 )
where v1and v2are the conjectural variations parametersforeachfirm.Whilethemuch-warrantedcriticismsof
conjecturalvariationsareacknowledged, ouruseofthemhereisrestrictedtocomparingCournotandBertrand
outcomes in a consistent framework; as shown below, the Bertrand-equivalent strategies in quantity-space
imply a conjecture in quantities less than the value for the Cournot conjecture.
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In the case of Cournot conjectures, each firmbelievesthatitsrivalwillnotchangeoutputin response
to a change in its own output, i.e.,
i. j = i = dx / dx = v i j i ≠ , 2 , 1 0( 7 )
Forthepurposesofthepresentationhere,allthatisrequiredtocomparetheCournotwiththeBertrand
outcome is that, in quantity-space, the value for vi will be less than zero when the goods are imperfect
substitutes. Specifically, for the Bertrand case, each firm believes that when it increases its output, the other
firmwill reduceitsoutput byjust enough tokeep itsown priceconstant. Thedirect demand functionsforthe
two firms are defined as:10
) ( 2 1 1 p , p D (8)
), ( 2 1 2 p , p D (9)
where p1 and p2 are their respective prices. The conjectural variations terms can be derived by totally
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change in its own price, the conjectural variations parameter is defined as:
,
0
















where vi < 0 for imperfect substitutes, and vi = -1 for perfect substitutes.
Equilibrium in the downstream stage can be derived by totally differentiating the first-
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12 , 2 2 22 , 2 11 , 2 2 21 , 2
22 , 1 1 12 , 1 21 , 1 1 11 , 1
(12)
The slopes of the reaction functions are found by implicitly differentiating the firms’
first-order conditions:
) ( ) ( 21 , 1 1 11 , 1 22 , 1 1 12 , 1 1
2
1 R v + R / R v + R - = r =
dx
dx (13)
. R v + R / R v + R - = r =
dx
dx ) ( ) ( 12 , 2 2 22 , 2 11 , 2 2 21 , 2 2
1
2 (14)
ForaCournotgamewith substitutegoods, thereaction functionswillbedownward slopingin quantityspace,
i.e., ri < 0. For a Bertrand game with substitute goods, upward sloping reaction functions in price space are11
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) ( ) ( 12 , 2 2 22 , 2 2 21 , 1 1 11 , 1 1 R v + R = a R v + R = a
. ) ( ) ( 11 , 2 2 21 , 2 2 22 , 1 1 12 , 1 1 R v + R = b R v + R = b
As Dixit (op. cit.) has shown, for stability of the duopoly equilibrium, the diagonal of the matrix has to be
negative, i.e., ai<0, and thedeterminantpositive, i.e., ∆ =(a 1a 2-b1b 2)> 0. Giventheseconditions,further
commentscan bemadeabout thereaction functions. ri =- ( bi)/ai from(13) and (14). Hence, ifai<0,thenfor
Cournot conjectures b i < 0, in order to satisfy r i <0 ,a n db i > 0 in order to satisfy ri > 0 for Bertrand











































Equilibrium in the Upstream Market
Giventhefixedproportionstechnologyandφ = 1, totaloutputinthedomesticupstreamsectorisgiven
byx
U(= x1). It is assumed that there are two upstream firms (A and B) whose combined output equals x
U,i . e . ,12
xA+xB=x
U. Theintermediategood isassumed tobehomogeneoussothatthedownstreamfirmisindifferent
abouttherelativeproportionsofxAand xBused in itsproduction process. Assumingthatthedownstreamfirm
faces no costs other than the pricepaid fortheintermediateinput, theinversederived demand function facing
firms in the upstream sector can be found by substituting p1
U for c1 in (5) where superscript U denotes the
upstream sector. Firms’ profits in the upstream sector are, therefore, given by:






A ) ( π (18)






B ) ( π (19)
where cA
U and cB
U are the upstream firms’ costs respectively.

























































4. Environmental Excise Taxes, Border Taxes and Non-Neutrality
The imposition of the environmental excise tax t
e at the domestic intermediate stage raises both cA
U
and cB
U. In turn, this raises the price of the intermediate good, i.e., the costs to the domestic downstream firm
c1. The cost increase to the domestic downstream firm also affects imports. This is given by dx2/dc1.T h e
bordertax adjustmenttargeted atthedownstreamfirm’sforeign competitordirectlyraisestheircostswhich,in
turn affects the level of imports. This is given bydx2/dc2. Since the GATT/WTO guidelines are unclear, the
neutral border tax adjustment (neutral BTA) is defined as either the change in c2 that keeps the volume of
importsconstantgiven theenvironmentaltax t
e,orasthechangeinc2thatkeepsthedomesticmarketshareof
imports constant given t
e.13
Import-Volume Neutrality






dc / dx -
t dc / dx = BTA neutral
e
(21)
When markets are competitive, then the absolute value of dx2/dc2 = dx2/dc1, so that the net effect is
such thatdx2=0. Consequently,theappropriatebordertaxshouldequaltheleveloftheenvironmentalexcise
tax, t
e. However, when marketsareimperfectlycompetitive, settingtheimporttax equaltotheenvironmental
excise tax will lead to a non-neutral outcome, dx2 ≠ 0.
Non-Neutrality with Bertrand Behavior
Consider first of all the effect of the import tax on the imports of the final good. Using (17):
. 2 1
1
2 dc a = dx
- ∆ (22)
Since ∆
-1 >0a n da1 < 0, the border tax (as expected) reduces the level of imports, i.e., dx2 <0 .
Then consider the impact of the environmental excise tax (which raises c1)o ni m p o r t s
using (17):
. 1 2 2
1
2 dc r a = dx
- ∆ (23)
Since ∆
-1 >0a n da2 < 0, the effect of the domestic excise environmental tax depends on the sign of r2.A s
noted above, with Bertrand behavior, the reaction function is upward sloping, i.e., r 2> 0. Consequently, the
right-hand side of (23) is negative which suggests that the environmental excise tax has a non-neutral impact
on imports as it further reduces imports. Specifically, since in a Bertrand game the goods are strategic
complements, the environmental excise tax imposed at the intermediate stage will reduce domestic output at
the final stage and imports. Consequently, with Bertrand behavior, since dx2/dc1 <0, to restore neutrality, the
appropriate policy is an import subsidy rather than an import tax.14
Non-neutrality with Cournot Behavior
Referbackto(23). WithCournotbehavior,r2<0, which resultsin dx2/dc1>0. Whethertheexpansion
of imports matches the contraction due to the import tax depends on two factors: the effect of the change in
costs on the final market, and the extent to which the domestic environmental tax, t
e, is transmitted into an
increasein thedownstreamfirm’scosts, dc1. Focusing, firstofall, on theformer, even ifdc1=dc2, the impact
of the domestic environmental tax will likely be less than the border tax. For example, if it is assumed that
2 1 a a ≈ , since the absolute value of r 2 is less than one, a 2r 2< a 1. Second, consider the likelihood of dc1 =




U ), the extent to which the intermediate input price rises as a result of the domestic
environmental excise tax. Since the intermediate goods are perfect substitutes, then:
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As is well-known from the tax incidence literature, see for example Seade (1985), Myles (1987) and Stern




Neutral Border Tax Adjustments
Taking (21) and using (22) - (25), the neutral border tax adjustment for the domestic environmental
excise tax, can generally be given as (assuming a1• a2):
[] . ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 2
1








U U − ∆ (26)
It is clear that the form of the border tax adjustment, i.e., whether it is an import tax or subsidy,
dependson thenatureofcompetition in thedownstreammarket. Further, evenifabordertaxwasappropriate,15
i.e., with Cournot behavior, the level of the border tax will depend on the nature of competition in both the
upstreamanddownstreammarkets. Whenunder-shiftingoccurs,thebordertaxthatrestoresneutralityshould
be less than the level of the environmental excise tax. Intuitively, the reason for this is that with Bertrand
behavior,thedomesticenvironmentaltaxreducesdomesticdownstreamsalesandimports.Therefore,inorder
to maintain their negotiated market access commitments, an import subsidy is the appropriate policy. In the
case of Cournot behavior, the tax reduces domestic sales but increases imports. In order to maintain market
access at negotiated levels, an import tax is justified. However, since the increase in imports is less than the
decline in domestic sales, the border tax adjustment should be less than the corresponding domestic
environmental tax.
Import-Share Neutrality
In the case of import-share neutrality, the appropriate border tax rule is defined as one where the net
effect of the environmental tax t
eon x1and x2must equal the net effect of the border tax adjustment on x1and
x2:
. ] ) ( ) ( [ ] ) ( ) ( [ 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 c d / x d + c d / x d BTA = c d / x d + c d / x d t
e (27)
Re-arranging (27), the neutral BTA is defined as:
,
] ) ( ) ( [
] ) ( ) ( [
2 2 2 1
1 1 1 2
c d / x d + c d / x d
c d / x d + c d / x d t = BTA neutral
e
(28)
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t + r = BTA neutral
e
(30)16
In this case, defining ‘maintained market access’ in terms of market shares does not lead to the ‘sign’ of the
policybeingdependent on thenatureoffirmbehavior. In thiscase, sincethedomesticenvironmentaltaxwill
reduce the market share of the downstream firm, a border tax is the appropriate adjustment to make in both
cases.
Non-neutrality with Cournot and Bertrand Behavior
In the case of Cournot behavior, ri < 0, and given that  r1  > r2  , the appropriate border tax
adjustment exceeds that for the case of import-volume neutrality as given in (26), but still depends on the
extent of ‘under-shifting’ of the environmental tax as reflected in the change in the domestic downstream
firm’s costs dc1. For Bertrand behavior, ri > 0, and given that  r1 > r2  , the appropriate border tax
adjustment is now a tax, as opposed to a subsidy in the import-volume case. Note, however, that in the
Bertrand case, the neutral BTA is lower than in the Cournot case. Hence, the nature of downstream
competition still matters in the case where neutrality is defined in terms of import-share.
Border Tax Adjustments and Profit Effects
Itisinterestingtonotethatwhileappropriatebordertaxadjustmentscanbedefinedinthepresenceof
imperfect competition, the downstream profit effects of the two definitions of neutralityare quite different.
15
Thisisimportantsinceeven though theappropriatebordertax adjustmentwillkeep importsatthesamelevel,
re-distribution of profits between domestic and foreign firms can still occur. Specifically, in the case of
import-volume neutrality, the combination of the environmental tax and border tax adjustment shifts profits
away from the domestic firm to the foreign firm for the case with Cournot behavior.
In order to see this, first totally differentiate the profit functions (3) and (4):
c d + x d c - x d R + x d R = d c 1 , 1 1 1 2 2 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 π π (31)
, 2 , 2 1 1 1 1 , 2 1 2 , 2 2 2 c d + x d c - x d R + x d R = d c π π (32)17
and substituting in from the first-order conditions (5) and (6):
1 , 1 2 2 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 1 1 ) ( dc dx R dx R v d c π π + + − = (33)
, ) ( 2 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 1 , 2 2 2 2dc dx R dx R v d c π π + + − = (34)
Given dx2=0, π 1,c1dc1 =- xdc1, and, for Cournot, v1=0, it is easyto see that dπ 1 <0, i.e., domesticfirmprofits
fall. For the foreign firm, assuming a = 2 1 a a ≈ , (34) can be re-written as:
, ] ) ( [ 1 1 1 1 1 , 2
1
2 2 2 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 c d - c d r + c d a p x = c d + x d R = d -
c ∆ π π (35)
Given ∆
-1>0,p2,1<0,a <0,a ndr1 <0,a sl o nga s[.] >0,t he ndπ 2 > 0, i.e., foreign firmprofitsincrease. The
reason for this is that the border tax adjustment has been set appropriately, and is less than the domestic
environmental tax. From figure 1, it is clear why this should be the case, i.e., in order to satisfy the neutral
BTA rule that dx2=0, it must be the case that dπ 1 <0a n ddπ 2 > 0. The environmental tax shifts the domestic
reaction function fromRF1toRF1',andthebordertaxadjustmentshiftstheforeignreactionfunctionfromRF2
to RF2', such that the foreign firm’s output remains at x2 = x2'. Domestic firm profits fall to π 1', and foreign
firm profits increase to π 2'.
Turning to the case of Bertrand behavior, and assuming a = 2 1 a a ≈ , the domestic firm’s profit
expression (33) can be re-written as:
. ] ) ( [ 1 2 1 1
1
2 , 1 1 1 1 c d - c d r + c d a p x v - = d - ∆ π (36)
Under Bertrand, v1<0a n dr1> 0. In addition, p1,2 <0 ,a<0 ,a n ddc2< 0, as the optimal border instrument in
this case is a subsidy. Therefore, as long as dc1 >  r1 dc2  ,a n d- v1x1 p1,2[.] < 0, then dπ 1 < 0. In the case of
the foreign firm, (35) is the relevant expression. As long as dc1 >  r1 dc2  , and [ . ]> 0, then dπ 2 >0 .T h e
caseofBertrand behaviorissomewhatambiguous, butthesameresultholdsiftheborderadjustmentdc2isata
suitably low level.
In the case of import-share neutrality, the combination of the environmental tax and border tax18
adjustmentincreasestheprofitsofboth thedomesticandforeignfirmwithCournotandBertrandbehavior,i.e.,
the combination of the two policies essentially facilitates more collusive behavior by both firms (see Salop,
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-1>0 ,a <0 ,dc1> 0, and for Cournot behavior, ri <0,t he ndx1 <0a nddx2<0. For Bertrand behavior, ri
>0 ,s oa g a i n ,dx1 <0a n ddx2 <0 .
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F o rt h ec a s eo fC o u r n o t ,vi=0, and, ri < 0. In addition, in (39), p1,2 <0 ,∆
-1>0 ,a < 0, and [ . ] > 0, while in
(40), p2,1 <0 ,∆
-1>0 ,a < 0, and [ . ] > 0. Therefore, as long as p1,2∆
-1a [ . ] > 1 in (39), and p2,1∆
-1a [.]>1i n
(40), then dπ 1 >0a n d dπ 2 > 0. This result is illustrated in figure 1. The environmental tax shifts the
domesticreaction function fromRF1toRF1'. In thiscase, thebordertax adjustmentshiftstheforeignreaction
function fromRF2toRF2", such that domestic and foreign firmmarketshares,netoftheenvironmentaltaxand
neutralBTA, remain constantalongtherayfromtheorigin. Domesticfirmprofitsincreasetoπ 1", andforeign
firmprofitsincreasetoπ 2". In thecaseofBertrand behavior, vi<0,and,ri>0. Therefore, aslongasp1,2∆
-1a[.
] > 1 in (39), and p2,1∆
-1a [ . ] >1 in (40), then dπ 1 >0 ,a n ddπ 2 > 0. Again the Bertrand case is somewhat19
ambiguous, but the same result will likely hold.
In summary, for import-volumeneutrality,withCournot,andpossiblyBertrandbehavior,thedomestic
firm suffers a loss in profits while the foreign firm gains. For import-share neutrality, both domestic and
foreign firms benefit from an increase in profits under Cournot, and possibly under Bertrand behavior. The
political-economic implication is that the domestic firm has an incentive to lobby its government to define a
neutral BTA in terms of import share rather than import volume.
4. Summary and Conclusions
Thetreatmentofimportsisacommonconsiderationwhenenvironmentalexcisetaxesareimposedin
the domestic market. Even when the environmentalexcisetaxistargetedatintermediategoods,adjustmentsto
thebordertaxeson final(derivative)productsareusuallymadeexplicitin therelevantlegislation. Clearlythe
purpose of border tax adjustments is to ensure that domestic firms are notplacedatacompetitivedisadvantage
vis-à-visforeign exportersduetotheimposition ofenvironmentalexcisetaxes. Foreignexportersalsohavean
interest in the setting of border tax adjustments to ensure that they are not used as protectionist instruments.
Apr i or i , onewould expectaneutraloutcome, i.e., thebordertax adjustmentsforenvironmentaltaxes
should leaveeitherthevolumeofimportsorthemarket shareofimportsofthefinal good unchanged. Thisis
consistent with recent work by Bagwell and Staiger (op.cit.) regarding the issue of regulatory ‘chill’ and
maintainingmarketaccesswhen domesticgovernmentsareconcernedwithdomesticenvironmentalpolicybut
which mayhave an effect on market access. In large part, border tax adjustmentswilldepend on how‘market
access’ is defined and the nature of firm behavior. In this paper we have shown that when both the upstream
and downstream markets are imperfectly competitive, non-neutrality is likely to result. When firms play
Cournot strategies, an import tax set at the level equal to the environmental excise tax is likelyto be too high,
irrespectiveofthedefinition ofneutrality. When firmsplayBertrandstrategies,theborderadjustmentislikely
to be of the wrong form when neutrality is defined in terms of import volume. In other words, an import20
subsidyrather than a tax is the appropriate policyto ensure neutrality. Incontrast,whenneutralityisdefinedin
terms of import market share, the appropriate border instrument is a tax. Moreover, these policies can leave
domestic firms worse off even if the level of market access is maintained at negotiated levels. The overall
conclusion is clear: market structure considerations in both final and intermediate sectors are important in
setting the form and level of border tax adjustments for environmental excise taxes if the authorities are to
avoid being unwittingly protectionist. When markets are imperfectly competitive, even setting border tax
adjustments equal to the level of the domestic environmental tax is likely to be discriminatory.References
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Neutrality1 In this paper, the focus is on border tax adjustments on imports. However, environmental tax legislation
usuallyallows exemption from domestic environmental taxes when thegood isbeingexported. Thisimplicit
subsidy is also legitimate in the context of the GATT/WTO framework.
2Other recent papers that have focussed on the links between domestic environmental policy and trade
policy include Anderson (1998). Ederington (2001) also considers issues relating to the co-ordination of
trade and domestic policies in the context of GATT/WTO rules.
3In fact, the issue of border adjustments for domestic taxes has been long-recognized, Ricardo noting:
“In the degree then in which [domestic] taxes raise the price of corn, a duty should be imposed on its
i m p o r t a t i o n...B ym e a n so ft h i sd u t y...t r a d ew o u l db ep l aced on the same footing as if it had never been
taxed” (Sraffa, 1953).
4 SeeGATT Panelreporton ‘United States-Taxeson Petroleumand Certain ImportedSubstances’June1987
(BISD 34S/136).
5BagwellandStaiger(2001b)suggestthatcurrentGATT/WTOrulesbechangedsothatacountrycanraiseits
border tax in response to any domestic policy that increases market access. See proposition 4 in Bagwell and
Staiger (2001b).
6These definitions of (non-)neutrality are consistent with the justification for border tax adjustments in the
context of GATT/WTO rules. Article III of GATT states that border tax adjustments may not be applied to
imported goods so as to afford protection to domestic producers.
7Asnoted above, theGATT/WTO frameworkalsomakesallowancesforrebateson exported goodsthathave
been subject to domestic environmental taxes. We do not consider these issues in this paper.
8 The data reported here relate to fiscal year 1993/94 and are discussed in greater detail in Davie (1995).
9 The border tax adjustment for the US Superfund tax was the subject of a GATT Panel Report in 1988
following a complaint by the European Community. While the motivation for the Superfund Tax was for
environment clean-up, the European Community complaint was based on the argument that the imported
derivative chemicals had been processed abroad and that there was no pollution in the US to clear up. The
GATT Panel ruled that the US border tax adjustment was legitimate irrespective of the purpose for which the
domestictaxwasimposed. Inotherwords,thebordertaxadjustmentfortheSuperfundtaxdidnotcontravene
GATT rules as long as the border tax was not used for protectionist purposes. See Demaret and Stewardson
(1994) for further details.
10Had thelegislationbeenpassed,theClintonadministration’sproposalin1993foraBtutaxcouldalsohave
been added to this list of domestic environmental taxes. This proposed tax - aimed at cutting greenhouse gas
emissions - was expected to raise $70 billion over the period 1994-98 (Davie, op. cit.). Like most other
domestic environmental taxes in the US, the Btu tax proposal also recommended border tax adjustments for
imported products. The “imputed Btu tax” would have been imposed on imported products identified as
havingdirectenergyinputs. Esty(1984)reportsthatfacedwithGATTchallengestothisbordertax,theOffice
of the US Trade Representative advised the Clinton administration nottopursuethetax adjustmentproposal.
11 It is also assumed that there is no joint production. As Poterba and Rotemberg (1995) point out, in suchcases, it is not possible to prescribe the appropriate border taxes.
12 While it is unnecessary for the key results of this paper, the conjectural parameters can be interpreted as
indicating various degrees of competition (see Dixit, 1986).
13FollowingtheterminologyofBulowetal. (1985),whenri< 0 the goodsare‘strategicsubstitutes’;whenri>
0, the goods are ‘strategic complements’.




presence of environmental taxes, there is a literature on the explicit use of environmental policy as strategic
trade policy, e.g., Conrad (1993).